2014. “Rebalancing Indonesia’s Naval Force: Trends, Natures, and Drivers,” in Naval Modernization in Southeast Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences, ed. Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan. London: Routledge, pp. 175-203
Is Indonesia getting ready to become a regional naval power to balance India, China, and Australia? Why is the navy acquiring state-of-the-art complex platforms; some of which are considered offensive in nature, mightily expensive, and are unsuitable for its day-to-day operations? How do we make sense of the navy's overall force development plans and projections? This chapter seeks to address these questions and explain why and how the Indonesian Navy has been modernizing in recent years the way it has.
2013. "Containing spoilers: Civil-military relations and third parties in the post-Suharto Aceh peace initiatives", Asia Security Initiative Policy Series, Working Paper No. 25 (Singapore: S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013)
This paper seeks to explain why and how the Humanitarian Pause and the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia (GoI) broke down, while the Helsinki rounds succeeded in bringing about a permanent negotiated peace in Indonesia. It develops a theoretical model based on the presence of peace spoilers and their ability to derail the process, and submits that discordant civil-military relations and a weak third party incapable of resolving credible commitment problems increase the probability of the government’s armed forces emerging as a peace spoiler. On applying the model while examining the post-Suharto peace initiatives in Aceh, it demonstrates how the weakness of the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) and the discordant state of civil-military relations under Presidents Habibie, Wahid and Sukarnoputri led to the failure of the Humanitarian Pause and COHA while the strength and credibility of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and the concordant state of civil-military relations under President Yudhoyono accounted for the success of the Helsinki rounds.
2011. "Climate Insecurities in Indonesia: Implications and Challenges for Defence Transformation", Asia Security Initiative Policy Series, Working Paper No. 16 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies).
This paper seeks to identify and assess key climate insecurities in Indonesia and further explore how they could potentially influence the process of defence reform that has been ongoing in Indonesia since Suharto’s downfall in 1998. Key climate insecurities in Indonesia are related to energy and food security, large-scale disasters, drought, changing climate patterns and rising sea levels. Furthermore, this paper argues that given these security implications, the Indonesian National Defence Forces (TNI) has yet to seriously assess and incorporate climate change into its force development plans. Finally, this paper outlines some of the key challenges and prospects for TNI’s defence reform process, as it relates to climate change.
2008. "Spoilers, Partners and Pawns: Military Organizational Behaviour and Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia" RSIS Working Paper No. 161 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies)
This paper tries to explain the political behaviour of military organizations within the context of civil-military relations. The key purpose is to extract several key variables that could serve as a starting theoretical model for future research on Southeast Asian militaries and political armies in general. This would be done by analysing four distinct cases of political behaviours of the Indonesian military in its relations with the president. This paper aims to answer why these distinct behaviours occur, how they came about, and under what conditions would they be observed. This paper finds that the political behaviours of military organizations can be at least typologized into four distinct categories that depart from the traditional literature: regime spoiler, critical regime partner, uncritical regime partner, and regime pawn. This paper also finds that several variables could help explain such behaviours. First, internal military variables: the military’s self-conception and portrayal of the “national interests”; the degree of military unity and cohesion; and the institutional and individual interests of the key military leadership. Second, variables within the political leadership: the degree of civilian interference in internal military affairs, civilian strength vis-à-vis the military, and civilian handling of the domestic political condition. However, how all these variables interact, the degree of significance of each variable, and how they shape the military’s political behaviour would eventually have to depend on the national political, economic, security and social conditions of the specific time of the case at hand.
2014. “Indonesia’s strategic thinking: breaking out of its shell?", in Regional Security Outlook 2015, ed. Ron Huisken (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific), pp. 35 -38
While many Indonesians believe that Jokowi's maritime-centric doctrine has been a long time coming given the country’s archipelagic character, specialist observers recognize it as a departure from Indonesia’s traditional strategic focus on internal security and national development. Is Indonesia finally breaking out of its strategic shell?
2011. "Stirring from Beyond the Borders? American Military Assistance and Defense Reform in Indonesia", Asia Centre Southeast Asia Observatory Study
This paper seeks to assess and consider the security component of the new security re-engagement between the United States and Indonesia, especially those pertaining to military assistance to the Indonesian Defense Forces (TNI). Specifically, it seeks to address two broad questions: (1) why the US chose to engage the TNI using military assistance they way they have in recent years, and (2) given the context of Indonesia’s ongoing defense reform process, whether US military assistance would assist the process and how. In addressing these questions, this paper will review US military assistance programs in general and to Indonesia in particular. It will also assess the trends and challenges facing US military assistance in terms of instilling democratic civil-military relations and improving Indonesia’s defense reform.
*Reviewed by Australia Strategic Policy Institute’s The Strategist
2010. Evan A. Laksmana, “Dinamika Politik Militer Indonesia,” in Panduan Media dan Reformasi Sektor Keamanan, eds. Beni Sukadis and Aditya Batara. Jakarta: Indonesian Institute Defense and Strategic Studies and Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, pp. 91 – 111
Masih relevankah bicara politik militer di era demokrasi? Bagaimana militer mereposisi dirinya setelah lebih dari tiga dekade menjadi bagian dari rezim Orde Baru? Sukseskah reformasi militer kita selama ini? Apakah TNI kini telah menjadi tentara profesional yang melepaskan karakter politik dan niaganya? Pertanyaan-pertanyaan ini tentu muncul manakala kita disodori persoalan politik militer di Indonesia. Berbagai pertanyaan ini juga tentunya bukan persoalan baru. Banyak tinta telah tertumpah dalam usaha menjelaskan dan menjawab berbagai persoalan seputar politik militer dan hubungan sipil-militer di Indonesia selama lebih dari lima dekade. Namun kenyataannya, terlepas dari perkembangan di dunia akademis, persoalan politik militer masih menjadi “persoalan nyata” yang menghadapi keseharian kita
2010. "Dari ‘Reformasi Militer’ Menuju ‘Transformasi Pertahanan’: Tantangan dan Prospek ke Depan", [From Military Reform to Defense Transformation: Prospects and Challenges Ahead], Indonesian Review, Vol. 1: pp. 1 – 12
Tulisan ini akan menunjukan bahwa selama satu dekade terakhir, capaian-capaian signiﬁkan dalam reformasi TNI lebih terfokus pada persoalan peran sosio-politik militer, legislasi pertahanan, perluasan agenda keamanan (hingga reformasi Polri dan intelijen), dan sebagian persoalan anggaran dan teknologi pertahanan. Sementara itu, sebagian besar aspek-aspek kebijakan personil, pendidikan dan pelatihan, ekonomi pertahanan, basis teknologi dan inovasi, postur dan Tata Yudha (Orders of Battle) serta persoalan doktrinal, operasional, and kepangkatan masih hampir belum tersentuh
2009. “Molding a Strategic and Professional Indonesian Military: Policy Options for the Next Administration”, The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3 (August): pp. 352-363
This article addresses the strategic gap between Indonesia's increasingly complex domestic, regional, and global security environment, and the country's inability to fully reform its national military generally known as the Indonesian Defense Forces or TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia). Furthermore, while not neglecting the vast literature on Indonesia's military reform, as well as key reform policies, this article looks at two fundamental problems-the military's education and training system, and the strength of the civilian defense community that must be addressed if we wish to create a strategic and professional military, one that could tackle the country's increasingly complex security environment without usurping basic democratic principles in the long-run. This article also suggests that the President himself, instead of the Defense Minister, should be directly and personally involved in pushing any reform policies within those two areas. Finally, this article tries to move away from the current Security Sector Reform (SSR) parlance and discourse that has thus focused on the military's politics, business, and accountability-and their accompanying regulations.
2008. "Strategic Theory, Clausewitz, and the Indonesian Military", The Indonesian Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 86 - 106
This article suggest that we should start focusing on how to professionalize the Indonesian military by 're-militarizing' them, since the utter focus on 'de-politicization' and 'defense management' has appeared to have left out the need for 'capacity building' among the military professionals. One place to start is perhaps in the realm of strategic theory. The core theme here is that education in strategic theory is not simply focused on telling the military and civilians about what to think, but how to think strategically when we deal with the use, or threatened use, of military force amidst the increasingly complex strategic landscape. In addition, this article will also review the thinking of Carl Von Clausewitz, considered to be the founder of modem strategic thought. Finally, we hope to ascertain the significance of strategic theory, the relevance of CIausewitz, and perhaps draw lessons for Indonesia.